

BLUEPRINT FOR SOUTHERN BORDER SECURITY

CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL



**Committee on Homeland Security
U.S. House of Representatives**

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Introduction

Border insecurity is not a new phenomenon. For more than 25 years, Congress has increased border security resources in response to this challenge only to see illegal crossings and criminal enterprises continue to operate by shifting to other, less secure, areas of the border.

Since 9/11, billions of dollars have been spent on border security personnel, infrastructure and technology. The United States Border Patrol has more agents in the field today than at any time in history. There are also more miles of fencing and a wider array of technological solutions to help detect illicit crossings and the movement of narcotics than ever before. Yet, nearly everyone agrees that the border is not as secure as it needs to be.

The consequences of an insecure border are serious because of the destabilizing impact smuggling activity and subsequent violence have along the border. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), such as drug cartels, make billions of dollars by moving contraband across the border into the United States. Drugs, people, weapons, and money moving across the border pose significant risks to the security of the nation.

TCO operations are predicated on evading U.S. border enforcement. As the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) border security efforts become successful in one area, our adversaries adapt by shifting to other, less-secure areas of the border. Aware of existing weaknesses in border security, TCOs are quick to take advantage of these gaps. DHS must improve its ability to predict shifts in smuggling routes and be mobile enough to respond quickly.

DHS has relied on the "brute force" method to secure sector "hot spots" with ad hoc efforts. Those efforts in one geographic area are successful only in "squeezing the balloon," causing illegal border crossers to quickly adapt and shift to other border sectors where detection or interdiction by law enforcement is less likely. For example, in the early 1990s the greatest flow of illegal aliens came through the San Diego sector, but over the course of the next 25 years the flow shifted to the El Paso and Tucson sectors; today the Rio Grande Valley sector is the busiest sector in the nation. The flow of contraband and illegal aliens shifted away from the San Diego sector because added resources and fencing through *Operation Gatekeeper* improved enforcement and forced cartels to change smuggling routes and tactics toward the maritime domain. The thousands of square miles of ocean along the coast of California provide ample opportunities for maritime smugglers to travel undetected and to bring people and contraband into the United States along the uninhabited coast between San Diego and San Francisco.

Recent smuggling trends along the California coast demonstrate a shift away from smaller panga vessels that make quick cross-border trips to beach areas near San Diego, to the use of larger pangas which can transit farther offshore from Mexico and farther northward. A coordinated strategy is necessary to secure the border in its entirety and not simply push smuggling organizations toward the path of least resistance.

Vision for Border Security

More than a decade has passed since the creation of DHS, and the Department has developed neither a comprehensive plan to secure the border nor adequate metrics to measure the extent to which the border is secure. This is not a partisan issue; multiple administrations, of both parties, have failed to secure the border. The American people deserve better.

In order to finally secure the border, DHS must gain full situational awareness and a complete understanding of the gaps in our border security. There are steps the Department can take today to bolster assets and capabilities on the border to do just that.

Furthermore, without proper metrics to gauge border security successes or failures, it is impossible to quantify the return on investments made to address border threats. A new approach to securing the border is necessary, one that emphasizes the smart application of resources, identifies a defined end state, and establishes quantifiable results.

Lastly, border security cannot be achieved without attention being given to interior enforcement and working with international partners to stem the flow of illegal immigration. The federal government must both enforce consequences for those who break our laws by entering the country illegally and strengthen international partnerships to create permanent change.

This holistic approach to securing the border will ensure DHS has the proper manpower and technology in the right place at the right time to secure our border and the means to measure how effective these tools are. In conjunction with interior enforcement and international cooperation, operational control of the border can become a reality.

Achieve Full Situational Awareness

Achieving operational control of the border is the desired end state of national border security efforts, but how do we get there? Operational control of the border must be predicated on full situational awareness – meaning a complete picture as to whom and what are crossing the border. If situational awareness is not obtained, then DHS cannot know for certain that the border is truly secure, nor can it make informed decisions as to where to deploy its agents, infrastructure, and technology. To date, DHS has not been able to gain full situational awareness. Nonetheless, this objective is not impossible; it can be reached.

The record number of Border Patrol agents alone will never be able to bring about complete situational awareness. However, technology can fill this void, in part, through the use of aerial surveillance equipment that was field-tested in Iraq and Afghanistan. In earlier assessments by Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the use of Vehicle Dismount and Exploitation Radar (VADER) on loan from the Department of Defense (DoD) found that the U.S. Border Patrol may be apprehending less than half the illegal border crossers in certain sectors. This is significantly less than the estimates the Obama administration has put forward.¹

¹ Brian Bennet, “Radar shows U.S. border security gaps,” *LA Times*, April, 3, 2013.

Obtaining full situational awareness, achieved through the use of sophisticated technologies and agents on the ground, will give DHS the ability to clearly identify the location and frequency of illicit cross-border activity. With this information, the Department will have the ability to predict future trends to better inform DHS resource allocation, allowing operational units to respond accordingly.

Knowing a threat exists through situational awareness is a positive first step to gaining operational control, but gaining situational awareness alone will not provide border security. Good intelligence and the ability to respond are equally important. Response capacity must be developed and deployed in tandem with increasing situational awareness.

Smuggling organizations will adapt to additional security measures, so intelligence must be a principal driver of border security operations. CBP and other federal agencies must maintain flexibility to respond, through surge operations and mobile technology, to confront shifting threats to new high-traffic areas. Relying on static capabilities such as fixed towers and fencing is appropriate where there are persistence vulnerabilities at or near the border to maximize manpower elsewhere. The border fence in the flat open areas of San Diego and Yuma Sectors, for example, effectively discourages large groups of immigrants from simply walking across the border and provides Border Patrol agents greater time to identify and respond to threats in those areas. It is not however, a panacea that will work across the entire border.

The varied terrain across the U.S.-Mexico border presents a number of challenges in terms of determining the best mix of technologies and personnel to obtain full situational awareness. Certain geographic areas lend themselves to ground-based technologies such as fixed towers and unattended ground sensors; but other areas are better suited for surveillance by airborne assets (manned/unmanned aircraft or aerostats). The rugged terrain of many areas of the border makes cameras of little value as they are unable to see into the space below mountain crests.

There is no template that can be applied to allocate the same resources along the entire border. Varying terrain and threats will shape resource allocation requiring each sector to have unique requirements for technology, personnel, and infrastructure to first achieve situational awareness and ultimately operational control.

Technology should be deployed along the border to assist in increasing situational awareness, as part of a coordinated plan. In an era of diminishing budgets, DHS must work with DoD and other Federal agencies to maximize spending efficiencies and gain situational awareness on the border. Billions of taxpayer dollars have been spent since 9/11 on defense research and development, and that investment should be used to secure the nation at home. Additional surveillance equipment used successfully overseas, such as aerostats, has proven valuable in places such as the Rio Grande Valley to help gain and maintain operational control of the border.

The National Guard has been deployed several times along the southwest border to support the Border Patrol, including *Operation Jump Start*, which helped build additional fencing in 2006, and *Operation Phalanx*, which provided boots on the ground and has transitioned to additional air assets along the border. Utilizing National Guard deployments as short term surge operations will provide resources needed to initially achieve operational control. The National Guard is a

highly capable force that can fill critical gaps in border security coverage and allow additional time for DHS to build internal capabilities. It must, however, be the responsibility of DHS to ensure the long-term security of the border using Department personnel and assets.

Develop Outcome Based Metrics

DHS currently lacks a mechanism to effectively measure border security since it abandoned the use of the term “operational control” in 2010. At the time, only 44 percent of the border was under some degree of “operational control.” Without a clearly-defined set of metrics, there is no means to measure the success or failure at our nation’s borders.

In recent years, DHS measured border security effectiveness solely in terms of the number of individuals apprehended and additional resources deployed to the border, including the size of the Border Patrol, the number of miles of fence built, the number of unmanned aerial vehicles, and the amount of other border security technologies acquired.

Assuming the border is secure because billions of dollars have been spent on additional resources and Border Patrol agents is a bad assessment. A similar flawed approach would be to believe that education in America is successful because we invested \$10,000 per student. Increases in students test scores are a better indicator of success, rather than the raw dollar amount spent per student. Using input based metrics like money spent on the border is likewise a flawed approach; outcome-based metrics that examine effectiveness are superior measures of true border security.

DHS’s publically available metrics for border security are incomplete because they rely almost exclusively on the number of apprehensions to show success. Using the number of individuals apprehended as an indicator can be manipulated to suggest a positive outcome regardless of an increase or decrease in apprehensions. For example, increased apprehensions could demonstrate that the Border Patrol is more effective in apprehending people illicitly crossing the border. Conversely, it could mean that more people are attempting to cross the border and Border Patrol, as a percentage, may not be as effective. Similarly, decreases in apprehensions may either indicate that fewer people are attempting to cross the border illicitly or that the Border Patrol may not be effective at apprehending individuals.

For example, knowing that a quarterback completed 10 passes in a game tells little about how effective he was. More information is needed to evaluate his performance. Knowing the number of passing attempts compared to completions will show his actual effectiveness. Additional measurements can be used to evaluate his performance such as the number of turnovers, number of touchdowns and final score. What DHS needs is a better way to measure effectiveness.

Likewise, a more complete metric for border security would show the border crossing effectiveness rate by comparing the total number of apprehensions and turn backs to the total number of all attempted border crossings. Without knowing the total number of attempted crossers, including the number of individuals not only who are apprehended but also who are able to evade detection, DHS cannot measure how effective they are in preventing illegal border crossers from entering the United States. Getting to the total number of attempted illegal border crossers is not possible without full situational awareness. DHS has only limited situational

awareness of all illicit cross-border activity which makes it difficult to produce an accurate effectiveness rate.

A set of outcome-based metrics must be developed to measure border security between ports of entry, at ports of entry, and along the maritime border. At a minimum, border security metrics should measure data such as illegal border crossing effectiveness rate, illicit drug seizure and removal rate, and cocaine seizure and removal rate. These metrics should be implemented consistently across all the departments and agencies that address border security. Doing so will allow a clearer vision of the effectiveness of the total border security effort, provide useable data to alter resource allocation plans and help answer the question – is the border secure?

Enforce Strong Penalties

Securing the border must be accomplished through a layered approach. Interior enforcement is an important element in border security and should complement security at the physical border.

DHS security efforts must include the application of swift and strong penalties to illegal border crossers, including prompt removal and prosecution of smuggling networks. Increased penalties for aliens who have illegally entered or attempted to enter the United States will significantly reduce the likelihood of recidivism. Similarly, prompt removal of recent border crossers at and near the border, as well as in our nation's interior, must take priority within DHS.

DHS has implemented the Consequence Delivery System (CDS) to apply a specified consequence to illegal border crossers with the intent to break the smuggling cycle. The intent of the CDS is to deter individuals from making future attempts to enter the country illegally by applying a consequence to apprehension. The CDS is an array of specific consequence options, which can vary depending on the different levels of criminal activity. For example, a first-time border crosser will receive a lower level consequence than a criminal alien or a smuggler. Illegal border crossers must face increased consequences and prompt removals to lower the rate of recidivism.

The United States Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have several options and consequences they can apply to illegal crossers. These efforts aim to deter future illegal border crossings by applying consequences, such as criminal prosecution or repatriation, to areas outside the smuggling networks' areas of operation. These consequence programs include prosecuting Mexican citizens found smuggling aliens by the Government of Mexico, through a program known as 'Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security' (OASISS). This is an important initiative to prosecute individuals who may be able to avoid prosecution in the United States under established thresholds for federal prosecution.

Another successful program is *Operation Streamline*, which provides criminal prosecutions for persons illegally entering the United States in several southwest border sectors. DHS statistics have shown this consequence is a major deterrent for illegal crossing when it is applied. It is not a coincidence that Yuma Sector, where *Operation Streamline* has been in effect for the longest period of time, has one of the lower rates of recidivism nationally. DHS, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, recently rolled-back this important program that deters illegal crossings.

Other programs, aimed at reducing recidivism, such as the Alien Transfer Exit Program (ATEP), repatriates aliens into regions far from their entry location to disrupt future coordination with smugglers after their arrest and removal. ATEP is designed to disrupt the smuggling cycle in which deported aliens reunite with their hired smugglers to attempt additional illegal entries. This cycle leads to multiple illegal entries which strains available law enforcement and judicial resources. These programs provide consequences to deter future illegal entries and should be continued and expanded.

Leverage State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement

The Federal government holds the primary responsibility to secure the border. However, state, local and tribal law enforcement can be leveraged in this effort. DHS must integrate law enforcement personnel into its central strategy to secure the border and enforce the nation's immigration laws. Strengthening and clearly defining local law enforcement's roles and responsibilities will enable those on the border to more effectively conduct security operations that assist DHS's missions to deter, investigate and interdict illegal cross border activity.

State, local and tribal law enforcement agencies have a great incentive to secure the border and prevent criminal activity from occurring in their own jurisdictions. DHS grant programs are an important avenue to develop and sustain local capabilities needed to contribute to securing the border, especially in austere budget environments. A key example of the state-federal partnership along the border is *Operation Stonegarden*, which facilitates enhanced border security cooperation and coordination throughout all levels of law enforcement. Over the past four years, funds for this program, already only a tiny portion of federal border security efforts, have remained stagnant, and a funding increase is overdue.

Local law enforcement can also play a vital role in continuing to provide support to the Federal government by enforcing federal immigration laws as part of Federal task-forces. The 287(g) program allows state and local law enforcement entities to have the delegated authority from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for immigration enforcement within their jurisdictions. Proper funding of this program, as well as enhancing the authority of local law enforcement agencies, significantly increases the likelihood that recent border crossers will face penalties – reducing recidivism and strengthening border security efforts.

Finally, additional consideration must be given to communication capabilities to improve information sharing and maximize interoperability. DHS needs to ensure open communication with state, local and tribal enforcement agencies by including these agencies in both the planning and execution of operations. There is an essential need for interoperable communications capability to provide current, accurate, real-time information in the field.

Enhance Command and Control

The increasingly complex environment along the U.S. border drives the need for an interagency coordination structure, under a single joint command. DHS must mature previous efforts to coordinate operations such as the Joint Field Command, the South Texas Campaign, the Maritime Operation Coordination Plan (MOC-P)/Regional Coordinating Mechanism (ReCoM) and the Joint Harbor Operations Center (J-HOC). While these efforts have increased

coordination, they have lacked the ability to fully integrate the necessary components to complete the mission. Strong leadership is needed to develop these concepts and promote better cross-component coordination.

DHS must organize a new command structure that consists of all agencies with a border and maritime security mission, producing unity of effort. Border security challenges require different organizations and jurisdictions to work together under an interagency model. While combining the capabilities, assets and expertise of multiple partners is difficult and will require participation from an array of individual agencies, it is critical to effectively carrying out homeland security operations.

In the border security context, the establishment of an interagency command with a clear mission, specific goals and well-defined objectives is the first step to getting law enforcement agency buy-in. Each agency must feel connected to the mission and accountable to its results. There must be a unity of effort that spans the bounds of each individual agency because it is imperative that personnel with diversified skills are integrated together. Creating a command structure and filling key leadership positions with personnel from different agencies will promote trust, facilitate the sharing of law enforcement investigative information and ensure that all relevant agencies are involved in daily operations.

DHS must better coordinate efforts to disrupt and degrade transnational criminal organizations as part of its overarching border security strategy by working as a unified interagency command wherein each member-agency relies on the contributions of others. This coordinating body must not simply combine and command assets from the disparate agencies, but rather coordinate all border security efforts. A command structure of this nature is a concept of operations that engenders agency support, enabling DHS to ensure the facilitation of legitimate trade while simultaneously securing American borders.

Engage Internationally

The United States has the opportunity to work with South and Central American countries, and especially Mexico, to continue to strengthen the historic progress in partnerships for mutual security. The border between Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize is a focal point for criminal traffic coming from Central and South America. The flexible nature of transnational criminal organizations presents challenges to both nations that must be fixed together; the best place to address this is on Mexico's southern border.

DHS and DoD already engage in unprecedented cooperation with their respective Mexican counterparts. Mexico and the United States share common border objectives, to increase security and facilitate the expeditious flow of trade and travel. The two nations' respective law enforcement agencies have been working closely together through programs like the Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) to synchronize enforcement operations on both sides of the border.

Mexico's economy is improving and increased immigration from Central and South America have placed a great burden on Mexico's southern border. For instance, the number of Unaccompanied Alien Children (UAC) from Central America being smuggled through Mexico

and into the United States has significantly increased over the past three years. DHS must work closely with Mexico to secure Mexico's southern border and ultimately decrease the potential flow of illegal drugs and migrants to the United States. Programs like the Merida Initiative assist operational planning, training, and capacity building to support not only Mexico's security goals, but also U.S. security goals. Accountability and oversight of these programs are key to ensuring that taxpayer dollars are well spent to enhance U.S border security objectives.

Continued international partnerships and development in Central America, South America and the Caribbean will decrease flow of illegal immigration to the United States and establish a greater level of security in the region. The primary factors for instability in the region are failed economies, violence, and lack of security. Continued engagement to provide additional capabilities, technology, information and training to the region will help deter common adversaries and encourage economic growth, will relieve the urgency for migration and counter the effectiveness of transnational criminal organizations.

Conclusion

Despite multiple claims by the Obama Administration, the border is not secure. Undoubtedly, illicit drugs, weapons and criminal aliens continue to get across the border. We can no longer rely on the assumption that the border is secure because billions of dollars have been spent on additional resources over the past 25 years. This is simply no way to effectively measure border security.

Achieving operational control does not mean that DHS will be successful in stopping all people and narcotics that illicitly cross the border – that is an unachievable standard. True border security means that the overwhelming majority of illicit activity is stopped before it reaches our shores or is interdicted at or near the border.

The nation needs a plan to achieve this goal and reliable metrics to base policy decisions and resource allocations. Congress and the American people need to know that the government can secure the border – time is of the essence.

SECTOR LEVEL OVERVIEW

SAN DIEGO



Terrain Overview

The San Diego sector includes 60 linear miles of border with Mexico and 114 coastal border miles along the Pacific Ocean including coastal beaches, mountains, rugged canyons and high desert.

Major Threat Vectors, Current Operational State and Trends





In the early 1990s, the San Diego Sector was the busiest sector in the nation. Ports of Entry were routinely overrun by hundreds of illegal aliens crossing the border at the same time. *Operation Gatekeeper* reduced illegal alien traffic in the San Diego Sector by surging additional agents and facilitating increased fencing, stadium lighting and remote video surveillance cameras.

The Sinaloa Cartel controls the northern Baja peninsula adjacent to the sector's area of responsibility and is responsible for the movement of narcotics into Southern California.

San Diego is a low threat sector, especially in the urban areas due to several layers of fencing. Apprehensions are on the decline, as are seizures of marijuana and cocaine.



Trends between the Ports of Entry



Major Ports of Entry

- San Ysidro, busiest land port of entry in the nation
- Otay Mesa, 4th busiest land port of entry in the nation

Current Resources

- 2,500 Border Patrol agents
- 45 miles of pedestrian fence, 13 miles of secondary fence and 2 miles of tertiary fence
- 16 Mobile Surveillance Systems, tunnel detection equipment and Remote Video Surveillance Systems

Recommended Additional Resources Needed to Achieve Operational Control

- Increased tunnel detection capabilities
- Increased aviation detection and monitoring capabilities including aerostats, Maritime Patrol Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
- Increased maritime signals intelligence capabilities
- Ultralight aircraft detection capability
- Expand the use of low-cost “game cameras” to increase detection capability

EL CENTRO



Terrain Overview

El Centro Sector is located in Southern California in the Imperial Valley and consists of 70 miles of international border. El Centro's area of operation is principally desert with some mountainous areas and agricultural lands.

Major Threat Vectors, Current Operational State and Trends





El Centro, the second smallest sector nationally, was among the busiest sectors 10 years ago – largely due to neighboring San Diego Sector's illicit flow. Today, apprehensions have seen a steady decline and are at historic lows. Drug seizures are on the decline in the area as well.

The mountainous terrain in El Centro Sector limits the Border Patrol's ability to persistently monitor the area, and the current location of CBP Air and Marine helicopters limits air support time on station.

As with San Diego Sector, the Sinaloa Cartel controls the narcotics flow across from El Centro Sector's area of operation. El Centro is currently a low-threat sector.



Trends between the Ports of Entry



Major Ports of Entry

- Calexico, 7th busiest port of entry in the nation

Current Resources

- 1,100 Border Patrol agents
- 44 miles of pedestrian fence
- 14 miles of vehicle fence

Recommended Additional Resources Needed to Achieve Operational Control

- Integrated Fixed Towers
- Aerostats to provide persistent surveillance capability
- Man-portable Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to increase situational awareness in the rugged terrain
- Ultralight aircraft detection capability
- Expand the use of low-cost “game cameras” to increase detection capability
- Increase *Operation Stonegarden* funding to enhance cooperation and coordination among local, tribal, territorial, state, and federal law enforcement agencies

YUMA




Terrain Overview

Yuma Sector consists of 126 miles of border located in the southeast corner of Arizona and contains deserts, mountain ranges, large sand dunes and the Colorado River.






Major Threat Vectors, Current Operational State and Trends

Yuma Sector experienced a surge in illegal migration and narcotics smuggling during the mid-2000s until the use of mandatory prosecutions became common place. As a result, apprehensions have seen a steady decline and today Yuma Sector has the second lowest number of apprehensions along the entire southwest border. Marijuana seizures, however, have remained nearly constant and are recently on the rise despite the significant reduction of illicit crossings.

The Sinaloa Cartel controls the drug trade and plazas directly across the border from the Yuma Sector. With the exception of the continued narcotics trafficking, Yuma is a low-threat sector.



Trends between the Ports of Entry



Major Ports of Entry

- San Luis, 12th busiest port of entry in the nation
- Lukeville

Current Resources

- 900 Border Patrol agents
- 62 miles of pedestrian fence, 9 miles of secondary fence, 8 miles of tertiary fence
- 43 miles of vehicle fence

Recommended Additional Resources Needed to Achieve Operational Control

- Integrated Fixed Towers
- Additional mobile vehicle-mounted and man-portable surveillance systems
- Aerostats to provide persistent surveillance capability in mountainous regions
- Ultralight aircraft detection capability
- Expand the use of low-cost “game cameras” to increase detection capability

TUCSON




Terrain Overview

Tucson Sector covers 262 miles of border including most of the state of Arizona from the New Mexico state line to the Yuma County line.





Major Threat Vectors, Current Operational State and Trends

Until recently, more illegal aliens were apprehended in Tucson Sector than anywhere else on the southwest border, and today it accounts for the second highest number of apprehensions and significant narcotics flows. Tucson Sector leads the nation in pounds of marijuana seized and until recently had a significant quantity of cocaine move across the sector. Fifty-three linear miles of the Tucson Sector is constantly monitored by Secure Border Initiative (SBI) Block 1 cameras and will be a sector to receive additional Integrated Fixed Towers.

The Sinaloa Cartel controls the drug trade and plazas directly across the border from the Tucson Sector. Tucson is a medium-threat sector.



Trends between the Ports of Entry



Major Ports of Entry

- Nogales, 10th busiest port of entry in the nation
- Douglas, 16th busiest port of entry in the nation

Current Resources

- 4,000 Border Patrol agents
- 71 miles of pedestrian fence, 8 miles of secondary fence and 8 miles of tertiary fence
- 139 miles of vehicle fence
- SBInet Block 1 cameras

Recommended Additional Resources Needed to Achieve Operational Control

- Expand aerial detection, interdiction and monitoring operations capability through increases in flight hours and/or airframes
- Man-portable Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to increase situational awareness in the rugged terrain
- Additional Integrated Fixed Towers including the approaches onto Fort Huachuca
- Modernized Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS)
- Ultralight aircraft detection capability
- Expand the use of low-cost “game cameras” to increase detection capability
- Aerostats to provide persistent surveillance capability in mountainous regions
- Increase *Operation Stonegarden* funding to enhance cooperation and coordination among local, tribal, territorial, state, and federal law enforcement agencies

EL PASO



Terrain Overview

El Paso Sector covers the geographical region of the entire state of New Mexico, as well as two counties within west Texas for a total of 268 miles of international border.





Major Threat Vectors, Current Operational State and Trends

In the early 1990s, the El Paso Sector accounted for nearly 20 percent of all apprehensions along the southwest border. In response, the Border Patrol initiated *Operation Hold the Line*, which surged agents to the border. Apprehensions fell dramatically and as a result, El Paso sector today apprehends the third fewest illegal aliens.

Despite the relatively low flow of illegal aliens, both marijuana and cocaine still move through the sector in significant weight. The Sinaloa Cartel controls the drug trade and plazas directly across the border from the El Paso Sector. With the exception of the continued narcotics trafficking, El Paso is a low-threat sector.



Trends between the Ports of Entry



Major Ports of Entry

- Ysleta, 7th busiest for commercial traffic
- Bridge of the Americas, 13th busiest for commercial traffic
- Paso Del Norte, 12th largest number of passenger vehicles

Current Resources

- 2,500 Border Patrol agents
- 65 miles of pedestrian fence, 13 miles of secondary fence and 4 miles of tertiary fence
- 101 miles of vehicle fence

Recommended Additional Resources Needed to Achieve Operational Control

- Modernized Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS)
- Integrated Fixed Towers
- Ultralight aircraft detection capability
- Expand the use of low-cost “game cameras” to increase detection capability
- Mobile vehicle-mounted and man-portable surveillance systems

BIG BEND




Terrain Overview

Big Bend Sector is composed of 77 Texas counties and is responsible for patrolling 510 miles of river front along the Rio Grande River - nearly one-quarter of the country's southwest border.





Major Threat Vectors, Current Operational State and Trends

With the largest area of any sector along the southwest border, Big Bend Sector is remote and includes much of the Big Bend National Park. The nearest major expressway, I-10, is over 100 miles north of the physical border, making it unattractive for either the Sinaloa or the Los Zetas Cartels to smuggle people or drugs through the area.

Big Bend Border Patrol agents apprehend the lowest number of illegal aliens on the entire southwest border, and a relatively low amount of narcotics pass through the area. Big Bend sector is a low-threat area.



Trends between the Ports of Entry



Current Resources

- 600 Border Patrol agents
- 4 miles of pedestrian fence

Recommended Additional Resources Needed to Achieve Operational Control

- Additional Integrated Fixed Towers concentrated in the east/west ends of the sector
- Aerostats to provide surveillance capability in mountainous regions
- Man-portable Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to increase situational awareness in the rugged terrain
- Improved communications capabilities
- Ultralight aircraft detection capability
- Expand the use of low-cost “game cameras” to increase detection capability

DEL RIO



Terrain Overview

Del Rio Sector is responsible for 210 miles of the Rio Grande River and Lake Amistad, which form the border between the U.S. and Mexico. This sector consists primarily of farms and ranches.





Major Threat Vectors, Current Operational State and Trends

Del Rio Sector experienced significant illegal alien flows in the late 1990s and early 2000s before seeing a steady decrease of apprehensions that coincided with an increase in Border Patrol agents. Since 2002, the number of apprehensions in the Del Rio Sector has declined by nearly 70 percent. Drug seizures of both marijuana and cocaine are also a fraction of the amounts seized in the mid-2000s and are on a downward trajectory.

The Los Zetas Cartel controls the drug trade and plazas directly across the border from the Del Rio Sector. Del Rio is a medium-threat sector.



Trends between the Ports of Entry



Major Ports of Entry

- Eagle Pass, 14th busiest port of entry in the nation

Current Resources

- 1,500 Border Patrol agents
- 4 miles of pedestrian fence

Recommended Additional Resources Needed to Achieve Operational Control

- Increase monitoring for cross-river dams/culverts/footpaths
- Improved communications capabilities
- Man-portable Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to increase situational awareness in the rugged terrain
- Improved maritime capabilities in the Amistad Recreation Area
- Expand the use of low-cost “game cameras” to increase detection capability
- Increase *Operation Stonegarden* funding to enhance cooperation and coordination among local, tribal, territorial, state, and federal law enforcement agencies

LAREDO



Terrain Overview

Laredo Sector covers 171 miles of river front between the northwest point of intersection between Webb County lines and the Rio Grande and the southeast corner of Zapata County at a point on Falcon Lake near the Falcon Dam.





Major Threat Vectors, Current Operational State and Trends

Laredo Sector experienced significant illegal alien flows in the late 1990s and early 2000s before seeing a steady decrease of apprehensions that coincided with an increase in Border Patrol agents. Despite the downward flow of illegal aliens, drug seizures of marijuana have remained relatively constant over the last 10 years.

The Los Zetas Cartel controls the drug trade and plazas directly across the border from the Laredo Sector. Laredo is a medium-threat sector.



Trends between the Ports of Entry



Major Ports of Entry

- Bridge 4, 2nd largest number of commercial vehicles
- Bridge 1, 4th largest number of passenger vehicles
- Columbia Bridge, 10th largest number of commercial vehicles

Current Resources

- 1,800 Border Patrol agents
- 1 mile of pedestrian fence

Recommended Additional Resources Needed to Achieve Operational Control

- Additional maritime detection resources for Falcon Lake region
- Expand aerial detection, interdiction and monitoring operations capability through increases in flight hours and/or airframes
- Increase monitoring for cross-river dams/culverts/footpaths
- Ultralight aircraft detection capability
- Expand the use of low-cost “game cameras” to increase detection capability
- Increase *Operation Stonegarden* funding to enhance cooperation and coordination among local, tribal, territorial, state, and federal law enforcement agencies

RIO GRANDE VALLEY



Terrain Overview


Rio Grande Valley Sector covers 316 river miles along the Rio Grande and 317 miles of coast along the Gulf of Mexico.

Major Threat Vectors, Current Operational State and Trends





For most of the early 2000s, the Rio Grande Valley Sector had a stable number of apprehensions. However, since 2012, the sector has experienced an exponential increase in traffic, both in Unaccompanied Alien Children and adults from Central America.

Last year, agents in this sector apprehended the largest number of aliens, and the sector is on track to apprehend more than 250,000 illegal aliens for Fiscal Year 2014.

The Gulf Cartel controls the drug trade and plazas directly across the border from the Rio Grande Valley Sector. Significant amounts of marijuana and cocaine pass through this sector, and as a result, Rio Grande Valley is a high-threat sector.



Trends between the Ports of Entry



Major Ports of Entry

- Brownsville, 8th busiest port of entry in the nation
- Hidalgo, 10th largest number of commercial vehicles

Current Resources

- 3,000 Border Patrol agents
- 54 miles of pedestrian fence
- 16 Mobile Surveillance Systems and 5 Aerostats

Recommended Additional Resources Needed to Achieve Operational Control

- Additional aerostats to provide surveillance capability
- Manpower “surge” capacity to support intelligence-based operations
- Expand aerial detection, interdiction and monitoring operations capability through increases in flight hours and/or airframes
- Modernized Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS)
- Ultralight aircraft detection capability
- Expand the use of low-cost “game cameras” to increase detection capability
- Increase monitoring for cross-river dams/culverts/footpaths
- Increase *Operation Stonegarden* funding to enhance cooperation and coordination among local, tribal, territorial, state, and federal law enforcement agencies

EASTERN PACIFIC REGION



Terrain Overview

The Eastern Pacific region encompasses the coastal and offshore waters of California, Mexico, Central and South America. The waters of the Eastern Pacific are vast and weather patterns make offshore routes dangerous. There are ten nations (Peru, Ecuador, Columbia, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico) with territorial claims to the coastal waters in the Eastern Pacific.

Major Threat Vectors, Current Operational State and Trends


Drug cartels move bulk quantities of cocaine in the Eastern Pacific through common smuggling routes known as the Transit Zone. Smugglers travel several thousand miles off shore to evade interdiction. Drug cartels primarily smuggle cocaine, originating in South America, into Mexico; the cocaine is then smuggled in much smaller quantities across the southwest border of the United States.

Cocaine is moved towards North America by the sophisticated coordination of strategically placed supply boats which support the movement of cocaine on much faster and harder to detect “go fast” boats. Cartels have developed more sophisticated self-propelled semi-submersible vessels to transport cocaine in the Transit Zone. These vessels can travel distances of up to 2,000 miles and are designed to be difficult to detect: they are painted to blend in with the water; barely protrude from the water; and travel at slow speeds causing a minimal wake for detection.

The primary method to smuggle illicit contraband to the California coastline is through the use of small vessels called panga boats. These low profile boats typically range between 25-45 feet long, have an open wooden or fiberglass hull and are powered by up to four outboard engines. These boats carry large quantities of drugs and are fast moving with a low profile making them extremely difficult to detect. Recent trends show these vessels are traveling hundreds of miles offshore and landing further north along the coast, with some coming in far north as Santa Barbara and Monterey counties in California.

Counternarcotic interdiction efforts are coordinated by the Joint Interagency Task Force – South located in Key West, Florida. The U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S.

Navy and allied naval forces provide operational platforms to detect, interdict and deter smuggling along the transit zone. Specifically, U.S. Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement Teams deploy onboard U.S. Navy ships and use Navy resources to conduct interdiction operations. The U.S. Navy significantly reduced counternarcotic operations in the Eastern Pacific following sequestration, which was a major contributing factor to the decrease in interdictions for FY 2013.



Current Resources

- Coast Guard Resources
 - 3 National Security Cutters
 - 7 High Endurance Cutters
 - 14 patrol boats (Fast Response Cutter/110’/87’)
 - 3 Medium Endurance Cutters (270’/210’)
 - 17 aircraft
 - 130 deployable tactical law enforcement personnel
- CBP Air and Marine Resources
 - 43 fixed-wing aircraft
 - 86 rotary-wing aircraft
 - 99 small vessels
 - 400 law enforcement personnel

Recommended Additional Resources Needed to Achieve Operational Control

- Increased cutter and boat hours and operation platforms to conduct interdiction operations
- Increased maritime signals intelligence capabilities
- Increased coastal maritime domain awareness and surveillance/detection capabilities, including: aerostats, unmanned aerial vehicles, maritime patrol aircraft and coastal radar surveillance systems
- Increased role of the U.S. Navy in counter-smuggling and interdiction efforts through operations with the Joint Interagency Task Forces and the U.S. Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement Teams

CARIBBEAN AND GULF REGION



Terrain Overview


The Caribbean area of operation encompasses the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. This includes the coastal waters of many Central and South American nations as well as the 28 Caribbean island nations.

Major Threat Vectors, Current Operational State and Trends

Drug cartels move bulk quantities of cocaine in the Caribbean through common smuggling routes known as the Transit Zone. The intent of the drug cartels is to smuggle cocaine originating in South America into Mexico to then be smuggled in much smaller quantities across the southwest border. Additionally, the proximity of U.S. Gulf States to Caribbean island nations makes smuggling directly to the U.S. coastline a viable option.

Cocaine is moved toward North America by hard to detect “go fast” boats. Utilizing Caribbean island nations as shields to detection and for legal protection, these vessels systematically travel through the Caribbean. Cartels have developed more sophisticated self-propelled semi-submersible vessels to transport cocaine in the Transit Zone. These vessels can travel distances of up to 2,000 miles and are designed to be difficult to detect: they are painted to blend in with the water; barely protrude from the water; and travel at slow speeds causing a minimal wake for detection.

Counternarcotic interdiction efforts are coordinated by the Joint Interagency Task Force – South located in Key West, Florida. The U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Navy and allied naval forces provide operational platforms to detect, interdict and deter smuggling along the transit zone. Specifically, U.S. Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement Teams deploy onboard U.S. Navy ships and use Navy resources to conduct interdiction operations. The U.S. Navy significantly reduced counternarcotic operations in the Eastern Pacific following sequestration, which was a major contributing factor to the decrease in interdictions for FY 2013.



Current Resources

- Coast Guard Resources
 - 2 National Security Cutters
 - 1 High Endurance Cutter
 - 24 Medium Endurance Cutters (270'/210')
 - 48 patrol boats (Fast Response Cutters/110'/87')
 - 353 small boats
 - 70 aircraft
 - 130 Deployable Tactical Law Enforcement Personnel

- CBP-Office of Air and Marine Resources
 - 14 fixed-wing aircraft
 - 12 rotary-wing aircraft
 - 59 small vessels
 - 290 law enforcement personnel

Recommended Additional Resources Needed to Achieve Operational Control

- Increased cutter and boat hours and operation platforms to conduct interdiction operations
- Increased maritime signals intelligence capabilities
- Increased coastal maritime domain awareness and surveillance/detection capabilities including aerostats, unmanned aerial vehicles, maritime patrol aircraft and coastal radar surveillance systems
- Increased role of the U.S. Navy in counter-smuggling and interdiction efforts through operations with the Joint Interagency Task Forces and the U.S. Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement Teams
- Modernized Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS)
- Continued support and partnership with the 28 Caribbean island nations to facilitate the deterrence and interdiction of smuggling operations